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DONALD DAVIDSON, PATRICK SuPPES, AND SIDNEY SIEGEL. Decision Making, An Experi- 
mental Approach. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957. Pp. 121. 
The basic problem which the authors have set out to tackle in the studies reported 
in this book is the separation of the effects of psychological probability and utility in de- 
cision making. They have considered this problem both in its theoretical framework and 
in the experimental verification of the theories set forth. The first chapter gives an intro- 
ductory discussion of the problems of empirical interpretation of theories of decision making 
under uncertainty. The second chapter fills almost half of the book and deals with the 
basic model proposed by the authors. The third chapter reports an experiment which was 
designed to measure the cardinal utility of nonmonetary outcomes and to use the computed 
utilities to predict further choices. Two models were compared, one a linear programming 
model and the other an ordinal model based on straightforward comparisons. The linear 
programming model turned out to be considerably superior to the other and both were 
much superior to a random guessing method; moreover, if thresholds are ignored in order 
to obtain a larger number of predictions the accuracy remains significantly better than 
chance. The fourth chapter considers the problem of formulating utilities for incomparable 
outcomes; in contrast with the two preceding chapters the considerations here are entirely 
axiomatic in character. 
The second chapter offers an explicit theory for the explanation of individual decision 
making under conditions of risk, and reports an experiment designed to test the theory 
in certain limited situations. The first step in the theory is to construct an event which 
has a psychological probability of one-half. Next, a set of six outcomes is constructed so 
as to be equally spaced in utility, and from these a utility function is constructed which 
is adequate to account for a certain class of preference and indifference relations. The 
experimental results lead the authors to conclude among other things that (1) the theory 
provides a practical approach to the problem of resolution of utility and psychological 
probability in situations involving risk; (2) under suitably controlled conditions certain 
people make choices among risky alternatives as though they were attempting to maxi- 
mize expected utility, and (3) for such persons it is possible to construct a utility function 
unique up to a linear transformation. The point of departure for this model was the work 
of Mosteller and Nogee (An experimental measurement of utility, Journal of Political 
Economy, 1951, 59, 371-404); connections with other previous work are traced and a short 
but well-chosen bibliography is included. 
In my opinion this book will take a prominent place in the literature of decision 
making, but it is also clear that it does not represent the final word on any of the points 
considered. The expository level of the book is excellent; the prospective reader should be 
prepared for a reasonable amount of mathematical development of the axiom-definition- 
theorem type. 
R. IV[. THRALL 
University of Michigan 
WAm~EN S. TORGERSON. Theory and Methods of Scaling. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 
1958. Pp. xiii + 460. 
In 1950 the Social Science Research Council appointed a Committee on Scaling 
Theory and Methods to review the status of scaling procedures in the social sciences. This 
committee came to the inevitable conclusion that a good survey of the recent and prolific 
work on scaling procedures was necessary. In 1951, Warren Torgerson, as a Research 
Associate of the Council, undertook the preparation of a monograph on scahng procedures. 
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After seven years, two of which constituted a long lost weekend in the Navy, the mono- 
graph had become a book and was published, 
The result of Torgerson's and the Committee's efforts is a book which will be of 
considerable influence and o£ great value to social scientists. I t  is an excellent summary of 
the state of the art and theory of measurement in the social sciences, the sort of book of 
which there is a very real shortage in psychology and the social sciences in general. I t  was 
not written as an undergraduate textbook, and probably cannot be used as such. While 
written prhnarily as a reference book for technical workers, it does seem possible to use 
it at the graduate level if a reasonable mathematical background is assumed on the part 
of the student. I suspect it will be more widely used than was anticipated. 
Whatever shortcomings the book has are due more to the state of the art than to 
incorrect handling of the issues by the author. Torgerson provides an excellent organi- 
zation of the scaling methods as they are in fact used; the various methods are covered 
in sufficient detail to enable anybody to use a particular method after a thorough reading 
of the appropriate section of the book. While extensive mathematical treatment of the 
various methods is provided, the author does not remain solely at the abstract mathe- 
matical level, but introduces the reader to the realities of collecting data and treating 
them as required by a particular scaling technique. The book is, in other words, a happy 
combination of erudite sophistication and down-to-earth realism. 
The book starts out with the usual introductory and organizing chapters--in this 
case three of them. The first two chapters cover the nature of measurement, types of 
measurement, etc. The third chapter organizes measurement as it occurs in psychology 
into three classes: (1) where subjects are scaled; (2) where the stimuli are scaled, and 
subject differences are attributed to sampling error; and (3) where both stimuli and sub- 
jects are scaled from the same set of data. The first type has not led to any important 
scaling developments and is largely ignored. The second type, called the judgment approach, 
and the 1;bird, called the response approach, form the basis for the organization of the rest 
of the book. The term response for the last approach is a little unfortunate, since it  does 
not differentiate that approach from the second, in which responses are also made. 
The next seven chapters deal with the judgment methods. Three chapters are de- 
voted to subjective estimates, fractionation, and equisection methods--those methods 
which involve some appreciation on the part of the subject of numerical values on the 
subjective continuum under consideration. The next four chapters deal with the discrimi- 
native, or differential sensitivity methods--all those methods which are based primarily 
on the Thurstone models. The last three chapters are concerned with the response methods. 
One chapter is concerned primarily with the Guttman techniques, one is concerned with 
La~arsfeld's latent-structure model, and the last is concerned with the techniques de- 
veloped by Coombs and his students for dealing with comparative response data. 
There is no need to go into the specific content of each chapter. Each deals with its 
subject matter in a detailed and thorough way. The only chapter which I wish had not 
been included is that which introduces the differential sensitivity methods, and treats 
briefly and lightly of the traditional psychophysical methods. In the rest of the book if 
Torgerson covered a subject at all, he covered it thoroughly. In this one chapter, however, 
the coverage of the psychophysical procedures is entirely inadequate, and it would have 
been more in keeping with the rest of the book not to discuss the subject at all. 
My major over-all reactions to the book were concerned less with what Torgerson 
wrote than with the state of measurement theory and practice in psychology today. For 
example, Torgerson sets up quite clearly the different types of data matrix which are used 
in scaling work, and differentiates methods on the basis of the nature of the data. He 
makes clear the kinds of assumptions which are made with regard to both the stimulus 
and the subject variables in such matrices, and thus provides a more fundamental look 
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at the over-all picture than is customary. However, I found a desire to go back a step 
further, and to note that  all basic sets of data involve three variables--stimulus, subject, 
and response--and that  all of them have certain relations to the underlying true conti- 
nuum. Just  as each stimulus, or each subject, can be located on the continuum, so can 
each response---and there can be interactions between all three variables. I t  is not really 
necessary to assume anything fixed by the response, even a comparative response, and 
a truly general model for measurement would include solutions for the response as well 
as for stimuli and subjects. I t  is usual, of course, to have stimuli and subjects be orthogonal 
in experiments, while neither will normally be orthogonal to the response variable. I t  is 
quite possible, however, to give each subject a response and then tell him to find the stim- 
ulus which satisfies this response---just as is done with some frac~ionation procedures and 
with the equisection procedure. Any truly fundamental model for measurement must be 
able to deal with the relations between all three variables and the underlying continuum. 
Actually, of course, we run into the reality of the lack of degrees of freedom for 
complete solutions, as Torgerson so often points out. And in fact the practical solutions 
with which we must deal often are such that an equivalent solution could have been ob- 
tained with simplifying assumptions other than those actually made. Using assumptions 
about the values or distributions of any of the three basic variables, we can solve for 
values of the other one or two. A change in the variables about which the assumptions 
are made will change the solutions as well. Ia  other words, we cannot create more knowl- 
edge than the data give us; we can simply assign the knowledge to different variables. 
In this frame of mind, I have one last reaction to report. I t  is that  we have more 
sophistication about the nature of mathematical models of measurement than we do about 
experimental techniques for validating the models. Elegant scales can be constructed, but  
only after we have made enough assumptions to reduce the number of parameters to the 
number of available independent observations. Any verification of the assumptions re- 
quires the availability of more degrees of freedom, and experimental techniques must be 
devised which provide these degrees of freedom in a form appropriate to the assumptions 
being made. The mathematical models tel1 us only what can be so; better experimental 
techniques are necessary to tell us whether it is so. 
These reactions are not intended as criticisms of the book, but rather as compliments 
to it. The book presents the whole range of material in sufficiently compact form that  
one is forced to try to get an overview. This fact, plus the over-all excellence of the pre- 
sentation, will stimulate new and good research. I am tempted to say--and so I will say- -  
that  this book is a milestone. 
WENDELL R. GARNER 
The Johns Hopkins University 
D. A. S. FRASER. Nonparametric Methods in Statistics. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 
1957. Pp. x + 299. 
Nonparametric Methods in Statistics (NMS) is an advanced work in statistical theory. 
N M S  consists of two parts: an introduction to recent developments in the Neyman-Pearson 
tradition in statistical inference (Chapters 1 and 2) and an application of these develop- 
ments to nonparametric statistics (Chapter s 3, 4, 5, and 7). In addition, Chapter 6 i8 a 
survey of limit theorems useful in nonparametrie theory. 
The mathematieafbackground necessary for comfortably reading N M S  is a year 's 
course in function theory. With less than advanced calculus the statements of many of 
the definitions and theorems are hardly intelligible. Mood (Introduction to the Theory of 
Statistics, McGraw-Hill, 1950) or preferably Cram4r (Mathematical Methods of Statistics, 
Princeton University Press, 1946) are reasonable prerequisites in statistical theory. With- 
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out this background, N M 8  can possibly be used as a reference book for the theory. Siegel's 
book (Nonparametric Statistics, McGraw-Hill, 1956), at  the other extreme, is nearly devoid 
of theory and mathematical content. 
Besides the standard Neyman-Pearsoa optimum properties (e.g., most powerful, 
unbiased, and consistent), sufficiency, invariance, and completeness are stressed. These 
ideas are developed extensively and used in finding good nonparametric procedures--  
tests of hypotheses, point estimates, and tolerance intervals. Sufficiency and invarianee 
have a strong intuitive appeal as criteria for optimality. Completeness is a mathematical 
condition that  is useful when available. To illustrate these ideas consider the following 
problem. I t  is assumed that  X I ,  " • , X~ ,  YI, • "" , Y,, are mutually independent random 
variables. Assume all of the X's  have a common distribution and all of the Y's have a 
common distribution (not necessarily the same as that  of the X's). How should one esti- 
mate Pr (X~ < Yi)? (Pr (X~ < Y~) appears in the study of the Wilcoxon two-sample 
procedure.) 
I t  is clear that  the (temporal) order in which the observations are made is irrelevant 
and attention can be restricted to X(1) , . . -  , X(m) , Yo) , " ' "  , Y(,) , where X(~) is the 
smallest of X~ , . - .  , X~ ; X(~) is the second smallest, etc. In short, the order statistics 
form a sufficient statistic for the problem. The parameter of interest, Pr  (X~ < Xi), will 
have the same value whether the original random variables are used or whether any mono- 
tone increasing funcgon (e.g., exponential of the random variable) is used. Therefore i t  
is reasonable to restrict attention to those estimators tha t  will not  change when an arbi- 
trary monotone transformation of the observations is applied. This is the principle of 
invariance. For this problem, invariance implies that  the estimator must be a function 
of the ranks. Completeness implies that  there is a unique unbiased estimator (and hence 
minimal variance unbiased estimator) which is a function of the invariant sufficient sta- 
tistic (the ranks). I t  is the number of pairs (X~ , Yi), where X~ < Y i ,  divided by mn. 
The approach of the above paragraph is applied to many estimating and testing 
experiments which arise in practice, e.g., (a) making inferences from ~ random sample 
about the location parameter of a distribution; (b) testing the null hypothesis that  c 
samples come from the same distribution against the alternative that  the c samples come 
from distributions differing in location only; (c) making inferences about the amount of 
dependence in a bivariate distribution function, i.e., testing for independence and esti- 
mating correlation; and (d) constructing tolerance sets from univariate and multivariate 
data. 
The orientation towards Neyman-Pearson theory and linear models (analysis of 
variance, etc.) explains the lack of emphasis on tests of goodness of fit. In keeping with 
the theoretical orientation, many mathematical examples are given, and, on the other 
hand, applied examples and tables of distributions are not  given. 
I. RICHARD SAVAGE 
Un@ersity of Minnesota 
PHILIP J.  McCARTHY. Introduction to Statistical Reasoning. New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1957. Pp. xiii + 402. 
The author states his aims clearly in the Preface: " . . .  a one-semester, nonmathe- 
matical course in statistics in which the instructor wishes to present a careful introduction 
to statistical r e a s o n i n g . . . .  A first course should emphasize the concepts of statistical 
reasoning rather than at tempt  to cover the wide variety of techniques . . . .  Illustrative 
material should be drawn from investigations that  are as significant as possible, and . . . 
has been chosen to range broadly over the social sciences. A very brief account of research 
problems usually accompanies each illustrative example and any s t u d e n t . . ,  may expect 
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to improve his insight into the problems of research methodology in the social sciences . . . .  
This selection of illustrative material from the social sciences has also influenced to some 
extent the topics discussed in the book." 
I agree with these aims and judge that the author has met them very well indeed; 
hence, I recommend this excellent book for a one-semester, nonmathematical, introduc- 
tory statistical course in the social sciences. It  excels in the choice of exercises and illus- 
trations drawn from important research publications in the social sciences, has many 
good examples and fine figures, tables, and charts to illustrate the important problems. 
How does this book differ from some of its better competitors? First, it emphasizes, 
as the title states, statistical reasoning and inference rather than statistical techniques 
and manipulation. Rather than trying to provide a reference book on a large variety of 
statistical techniques, the author concentrates on a thorough presentation of the nature 
of statistical inference. He does this briefly in two chapters which contain the two most 
useful statistical methods for social scientists: Chapter 8, The Binomial Probability Model 
and Statistical Inference; and Chapter 9, Drawing Statistical Inferences from the Arith- 
metic Mean of a Large Sample. 
Second, the statistical problems and examples are not alienated from their origins 
and their destinations. The problems and examples are established firmly in the substan- 
tive problems from which they arise, and in the problems of collection and processing 
which precede the data. The relation of sample to population is often and well developed. 
The meaning of statistical tools and of statistical inference is constantly emphasized; 
that statistics and probability statements are guides to action and to decisions is the 
spirit that pervades the presentation (although there is no formal presentation of statisti- 
cal decision function theory). Chapter 2, The Components of Statistical Investigation, 
presents this approach early and well. 
Third, the writing is rigorous and precise. The presentation is not mathematical 
and does not require a mathematical background, but it does demand close attention 
and careful reading. The style is clear, precise, and to the point, and will aid the student 
through the hard thinking that rigorous statistical inference demands. 
Chapters 3 through 7 deal well with the necessary introductory topics of distribu- 
tions, their locations and spread, and the elements of probability. Chapter 10 gives in 
30 pages an excellent, lucid, and penetrating presentation of Elements of Sample Design. 
Each of the last two chapters presents an important technique for social scientists: Chap- 
ter 11, Chi-Square Procedures for Qualitative Data, and Chapter 12, The Linear Associa- 
tion of Two Quantitative Variables. 
Some instructors will prefer to add one or two additional techniques to complete 
the course; for economists, perhaps time series and indexes; for psychologists, perhaps 
the difference of two correlated means and the elements of experimental design. The 
student will have to read his assignments thoroughly and sometimes repeatedly. The 
instructor will have to explain the finer points at greater length. But perhaps that is not 
too much to ask of a scientific subject in a scientific age. I think this is a good book. 
LESLIE KISH 
University of Michigan 
